In light of changing security situation confronted by India, do you think there is a need for
India to revisit its nuclear doctrine? Sketch your argument.
(15 marks, 250 words)
Answer:
The major factor behind the questioning of the Nuclear Doctrine stems from concerns about
NFU (No First Use). Dissatisfaction with our NFU posture is not new. Ab initio, in discussions on this in the NSAB a case against it was made out on the grounds that such an approach unnecessarily kept us on the back foot and on the defensive and made it axiomatic that we would have to face the
consequences of a first strike before being able to respond. Moreover, it prevented us from
keeping a potential adversary off balance. This view did not, however, prevail in the subsequent
discussions in the matter.
What is new about the increased opposition to the NFU posture is that it arises in part from
increasing evidence of Pakistan’s proclivity to use tactical nuclear weapons against us, and in
part from scepticism about our deterrent capability and about our willingness to respond to a
tactical strike with a “massive” retaliatory attack. Advocates of a change in our NFU policy would
like our nuclear doctrine mimic those of most of the established Nuclear Weapon States which
contemplate the use of nuclear weapons even in sub nuclear conflicts.
Since an important element behind the call for revisiting our nuclear doctrine emanates from a
lack of confidence in our deterrent and in our willingness to resort to the use of nuclear weapons
in a massive second strike in response to an attack on us with tactical weapons the same needs
to be addressed by much more effective signalling and a demonstration that the government will
do what it says and will not shy from making a robust response when necessary.
The following could be some moves in this direction:
1. Government must restore faith in itself by doing what it says and not shying from biting the
bullet. Firmness must be shown in all its actions, for instance, on issues of law and order, terrorism and addressing difficult neighbors.
2. Periodic statements about the nurturing and upgradation of our nuclear arsenal and systems
including alternate command structure.
3. An indication that our nuclear arsenal will be large enough to take care of all adversaries
and will have to be in the mid triple digits.
4. Appointment of a Chief of Defence Staff and upgradation of the NTRO as a capable apex
technical organization which would in a fool proof manner provide indicators of any attack on
us and ensure swift and massive nuclear retaliation inflicting unacceptable damage.
An indication that we have in place multiple, well camouflaged and well secured vectors which
are constantly being further refined in order to enable the country to inflict unacceptable damage
even after absorbing a first strike by its adversaries.
India to revisit its nuclear doctrine? Sketch your argument.
(15 marks, 250 words)
Answer:
The major factor behind the questioning of the Nuclear Doctrine stems from concerns about
NFU (No First Use). Dissatisfaction with our NFU posture is not new. Ab initio, in discussions on this in the NSAB a case against it was made out on the grounds that such an approach unnecessarily kept us on the back foot and on the defensive and made it axiomatic that we would have to face the
consequences of a first strike before being able to respond. Moreover, it prevented us from
keeping a potential adversary off balance. This view did not, however, prevail in the subsequent
discussions in the matter.
What is new about the increased opposition to the NFU posture is that it arises in part from
increasing evidence of Pakistan’s proclivity to use tactical nuclear weapons against us, and in
part from scepticism about our deterrent capability and about our willingness to respond to a
tactical strike with a “massive” retaliatory attack. Advocates of a change in our NFU policy would
like our nuclear doctrine mimic those of most of the established Nuclear Weapon States which
contemplate the use of nuclear weapons even in sub nuclear conflicts.
Since an important element behind the call for revisiting our nuclear doctrine emanates from a
lack of confidence in our deterrent and in our willingness to resort to the use of nuclear weapons
in a massive second strike in response to an attack on us with tactical weapons the same needs
to be addressed by much more effective signalling and a demonstration that the government will
do what it says and will not shy from making a robust response when necessary.
The following could be some moves in this direction:
1. Government must restore faith in itself by doing what it says and not shying from biting the
bullet. Firmness must be shown in all its actions, for instance, on issues of law and order, terrorism and addressing difficult neighbors.
2. Periodic statements about the nurturing and upgradation of our nuclear arsenal and systems
including alternate command structure.
3. An indication that our nuclear arsenal will be large enough to take care of all adversaries
and will have to be in the mid triple digits.
4. Appointment of a Chief of Defence Staff and upgradation of the NTRO as a capable apex
technical organization which would in a fool proof manner provide indicators of any attack on
us and ensure swift and massive nuclear retaliation inflicting unacceptable damage.
An indication that we have in place multiple, well camouflaged and well secured vectors which
are constantly being further refined in order to enable the country to inflict unacceptable damage
even after absorbing a first strike by its adversaries.
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